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Towards Model-Based Model of 
Cognition
In data mining, people are working (sometimes - 
with  almost  no  theory  behind  them)  with  a 
variety of  computer  models  that  are  extremely 
useful  in  practice,  but  hardly  resemble  their 
target objects. "All models are wrong, but some 
are useful." - as put by the statistician George E. 
P.  Box (1979:  Robustness  in  the  strategy  of 
scientific  model  building.  Robustness  in  
statistics, 201-236).
This  wide experience  with  "theory-less,  wrong 
and  useful"  models  is  provoking  three  radical 
ideas.  None  of  them  is  completely  new,  the 
novelty  might  be  the  composition  proposed 
below: let's consider philosophy of all kinds of 
cognition,  and  try  a  completely  model-based 
rewriting of it.
The first idea:  internally, there is no difference 
between  "true"  models  and  "wrong"  models. 
Mainly, we do not know in advance (sometimes 
-  for  centuries),  which  parts  of  our  models  or 
theories are true, and which are not. Sometimes 
we  know  that  our  model  is  "wrong"  in  many 
respects,  but  it  remains  useful,  nevertheless. 
Many  people  may  continue  believing  in  an 
overthrown model or theory for a long time - and 
continue  acting  accordingly.  Hence,  the 
somewhat  paradoxical  term  -  "wrong" 
knowledge.  This  corresponds  well  to  "The 
Dappled World" picture (Nancy Cartwright), see 
Paul Teller (2004:  How We Dapple the World, 
Philosophy  of  Science,  71(4):  425-447).  Thus, 
for  the  philosophy  of  cognition,  "wrong" 
knowledge should be as prominent a subject as 
the "true" knowledge.
And, if we wish to answer non-trivial questions 
like as "Is it true that quarks really exist?", then 
our philosophy of cognition shouldn't introduce  
the  notion  of  "truth"  too  early,  as  something 
primary,  and  therefore  -  mystical.  Truth  is 
emerging later - on top of cognition, it  doesn't 
reside  at  the  bottom  of  it.  We  can  derive 
ontologies  and  truths  only  by  analyzing 
invariants of a successful model evolution - as I 
tried  to  propose  in  "Is  Scientific  Modeling  an 
Indirect Methodology?" (The Reasoner 3(1)).
In terms of theories, a similar idea was proposed 
as  the  “Deepening  Maxim”  by  Paul  Thagard 
(2007: Coherence, truth, and the development of 
scientific knowledge.  Philosophy of Science,74, 
28-47):
"If  a  theory  not  only  maximizes  explanatory 
coherence,  but also broadens its  evidence base 
over  time  and  is  deepened  by explanations  of 
why  the  theory’s  proposed  mechanism  works, 
then we can reasonably conclude that the theory 
is at least approximately true." (41).
And by Jeffrey Alan Barrett (2008: Approximate 
Truth and Descriptive Nesting. Erkenntnis 68(2): 
213-224)  -  as  "a  notion  of  local  probable 
approximate truth in terms of descriptive nesting 
relations  between  current  and  subsequent 
theories" (213).
The second idea: models are the ultimate results 
of  all  (scientific,  non-scientific,  and  anti-
scientific)  kinds  of  cognition.  Therefore, 
philosophy  of  cognition  should  start  with  the 
following  fundamental  distinction:  there  are 
models, and there are means of model-building.  
Laws of nature and theories are useful only as a 
means  of  model-building  -  "The  Toolbox  of 
Science"  -  as  put  by  Mauricio  Suarez,  Nancy 
Cartwright  (2008:  Theories:  Tools  versus 
Models.  Studies  in  History  and  Philosophy  of  
Modern Physics, 39: 62-81).
The third idea: to cover all kinds of cognition, 
the notion of model should be defined as broadly 
as possible: a model is anything that is (or could  
be)  used,  for  some  purpose,  in  place  of  
something  else. To  put  it  somewhat 
paradoxically: models are tiny fragments of the 
Universe possibly usable (for some purpose) in 
place of other fragments (or, even in place of the 
entire Universe). Mathematical models, fictional 
worlds,  mental  structures  and  processes  are 
included here, of course. 
Among  philosophers,  this  broadest  possible 
notion of model was stated by Paul Teller (2001: 
Twilight  of  the  Perfect  Model  Model. 
Erkenntnis, 55: 393–415). But, among computer 
scientists,  it  can  be  traced  back  to  Marvin 
Minsky (1965:  Matter,  Mind  and  Models. 
Proceedings of IFIP Congress 65, 1: 45-49).
Minsky applies  the notion  of  model  in  a  way, 
that  is  very  natural  from  computer  scientist's 
point of view, but seems not very popular among 
philosophers. I would put this "robotic ontology" 
as follows:
In  my head,  I  have  a  model  of  the  world (an 
incomplete one, incoherent, inconsistent, in part 
- fictional, containing all my knowledge, beliefs, 
dreams  etc.).  And I'm acting  according  to  this 
model. In this model, other persons are believed 
to have their own models of the world (in some 
respects -  different  from my model).  And they 
are acting according to their models. I may know 
these models more or less, and in this way I can 
predict  -  to  some  extent  -  people's  behavior. 
Thus,  my  model  of  the  world  may  contain 
"models of models" - for example, a simplified 
model of your model of the world.
And, to complete the picture: how about model-
building  in  philosophy?  Perhaps,  many  will 
agree with Peter Godfrey Smith (2006: Theories 
and  Models  in  Metaphysics.  The  Harvard 
Review of Philosophy, XIV: 4-19): 
"...  much metaphysical  work,  especially of  the 
contemporary  systematic  kind,  might  best  be 
understood as model-building, ..." (4).
However,
"It  would  be  foolish  to  suppose  that  such  a 
hypothesis could be applied to all metaphysical 
discussion, but it might be true of an important 
part of the field." (5). 
But how about trying this "foolish" step?
If none of the above theses is completely new, 
then - what is missing? My general impression: 
despite  many  brilliant  insights,  generated  by 
philosophers  for  many  years,  the  field 
(philosophy of cognition) remains unordered for 
too long a time. For example, according to the 
account  given  by  Roman  Frigg,  Stephan 
Hartmann (2006:  Models  in  Science.  Stanford 
Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy),  there  is  still  no 
generally acknowledged unified notion of model. 
Or,  according  to  the  account  given  by  Eric 
Schwitzgebel (2006:  Belief.  Stanford 
Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy),  there  are  several 
competing approaches to explaining "what is it 
to  believe".  Couldn't  these  complications  be 
caused by the idea of "propositional attitude" - 
the idea that separate propositions are believed 
in, and not entire models, theories, or fragments 
of them?
If it's true that models are the ultimate results of 
cognition,  then shouldn't  we try reordering the 
field, starting with the notion of model? In this 
way,  couldn't  we  obtain  a  unified  and  more 
productive  picture  -  a  model-based  model  of 
cognition?
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